Banks weigh SIM-based logins as reported fraud losses reach $15.9 billion
People in the United States reported losing $15.9 billion to fraud in 2025, up from $12.5 billion the prior year, according to the Federal Trade Commission, with imposter scams alone accounting for more than $3.5 billion of that figure. Against that backdrop, Glide.id has released the public beta of MagicalAuth, a cryptographic authentication system the company says is designed to replace the texted one-time codes that banks and financial services use to verify logins.
Key takeaways
- U.S. consumers reported losing $15.9 billion to fraud in 2025, up from $12.5 billion the prior year, according to the FTC, with imposter scams accounting for more than $3.5 billion.
- Glide.id has released a public beta of MagicalAuth, a cryptographic authentication system meant to replace texted one-time codes used by banks to verify logins.
- MagicalAuth verifies logins using a cryptographic key built into a device's SIM or eSIM, with the bank querying the carrier network to confirm the expected SIM is present rather than sending or requiring a typed code.
- To counter SIM-swap fraud, MagicalAuth monitors for SIM changes in real time and blocks a newly transferred SIM from authenticating for a short window so the legitimate owner can recover the number.
- Coverage is not universal at launch, as some MVNOs, smaller carriers, and many prepaid customers are not yet supported, so banks are advised to keep a fallback identity check.
People in the United States reported losing $15.9 billion to fraud in 2025, up from $12.5 billion the prior year, according to the Federal Trade Commission, with imposter scams alone accounting for more than $3.5 billion of that figure. Against that backdrop, Glide.id has released the public beta of MagicalAuth, a cryptographic authentication system the company says is designed to replace the texted one-time codes that banks and financial services use to verify logins.
MagicalAuth is available through AT&T, T-Mobile, and Verizon on iOS and Android. Banks and other services must integrate the system on their own before their customers encounter it, the company said.
How the authentication works
Instead of sending a numeric code to a customer's phone, MagicalAuth draws on a cryptographic key built into the SIM or eSIM inside the device. During a login attempt, the bank queries the carrier network to confirm the expected SIM is present. No code is generated, transmitted, or typed by the user.
Eran Haggiag, founder and CEO of Glide.id, said a texted code is a shared secret that can be intercepted or tricked out of someone at multiple points along its path. The cryptographic key embedded in the SIM never leaves the device, he said, similar to the chip in a credit card.
The system requires no app download, no enrollment, and no configuration on the customer's side, Haggiag said. A user would see a consent screen on the first encounter; after that, verification is designed to run in the background in a fraction of a second.
SIM swaps and coverage gaps
SIM-swap fraud raises a direct question for any system tied to SIM identity. In that attack, a criminal persuades a carrier to move a victim's phone number to a different SIM, gaining access to incoming texts. Glide says MagicalAuth monitors for SIM changes in real time and blocks a new SIM from authenticating for a short window after the transfer, giving the legitimate owner time to recover the number.
Shawn Hakl, senior vice president and head of product at AT&T Business, said the carrier network can flag recent SIM activity before a sensitive login proceeds. That signal matters because SIM-swap attacks depend on speed, he said. A scammer tries to use a transferred number before the legitimate owner notices service has been lost.
Haggiag said the system does not make fraud impossible. A scammer who manipulates an account holder into approving a transaction directly faces no obstacle from SIM-based authentication checks, he said.
Coverage is not universal at launch. Glide says some MVNOs, smaller carriers, and many prepaid customers are not yet supported, and Hakl said banks should maintain a fallback identity check for cases where a network verification cannot be completed.